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Abstract - The present study evaluates the consequential 
economic and ethical problems which occur when 
bureaucracy is present in companies’ projects 
evaluation by governmental agencies. The delay of 
projects approval generates loss of value once projects 
may not be implemented or are implemented after the 
suitable time. Theory of anti-commons is presented in 
the contextualization of the problem.  As seen in this 
study, when an “anti-commons” emerges, resources 
may be prone to under-use. In an anti-commons 
situation there are too many entities deciding what may 
lead to the under-use of the resources. In Portugal, 
bureaucracy in projects approval contributes to such a 
situation of anti-commons. The present study analyses a 
project for the construction of an elderly nursing home, 
for which is necessary a permit to be obtained from the 
Portuguese government. This study is made according 
to the framework of the anti-commons theory. 
Keywords  ‐ Bureaucracy, Anti-commons, Elderly Nursing 
Home, Portugal. 
1. Introduction 
 The discussion on property rights is classical 
and in the last decades the discussion has been 
enlarged to consider new frameworks. An approach 
has been presented on some issues generated by the 
excessive fragmentation of property rights: the anti-
commons theory. Michelman (1982) has exposed the 
anti-commons as “a type of property in which 
everyone always has rights respecting the objects in 
the regime, and no one is ever privileged to use any 
of them except as particularly authorized by others”. 
Later, Heller (1998) stated that in an anti-commons 
problem there is a property regime in which 
numerous owners hold effective exclusion rights over 
a scarce resource. Therefore, the co-existence of 
multiple exclusion rights creates conditions for the 
suboptimal use of a resource. In the “tragedy of the 
anti-commons”, resources may stay idle even in the 
economic region of positive marginal productivity.  
A project in the construction sector (of an 
elderly nursing home) in Portugal is studied and 
allows to evaluate the possibility of using the 
hypothesis suggested by Buchanan & Yoon (2000) 
that bureaucracy can be studied with the help of the 
anti-commons conceptualization. 
In this context, some questions are posed about 
the time that a project needs to be approved by 
official entities and about the necessary 
administrative procedures in order to take the project 
approved. The bureaucratic procedures show the 
incapacity of administrative official structures to 
allow that economic system operate efficiently. 
Processes depend on too much legislation and on the 
will of a set of bureaucrats that often “want to show 
that they control the system”.  
Particularly in this case, it can be seen a 
significant delay in the project’s approval, what 
makes the project to get unviable because too much 
time has gone. 
An economic analysis allows to show how a 
problem of anti-commons can originate an important 
loss of value. It is seen how anti-commons tragedies 
appear in such situations as the ones that are shown in 
the present study’s problem. 
2. Anti-Commons and Bureaucracy 
After the introduction of the concept of anti-
commons by Michelman, the tragedy of the anti-
commons was formulated by Michael Heller to 
describe a coordination breakdown where the 
existence of numerous rights holders frustrates 
achieving a socially desirable outcome. 
Considering the anti-commons theory, 
generically, it can be said that when several rights 
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from using a scarce resource, this resource may have 
a limited and unsatisfactory use. This problem of the 
“tragedy of the anti-commons” reflects that the 
resource is prone to be under-used. 
After the emergence of an “anti-commons”, its 
particular passage to an efficient process may be long 
and extremely slow, due to the properties inherent to 
“anti-commons” and to the difficulties existing for 
overcoming the “tragedy of the anti-commons”. 
As a consequence of all this, it is necessary to 
make an important reflection about the definition of 
property rights to overcome several important aspects 
for resources exploitation. When there are too many 
property rights and too many rights of exclusion, 
tragedy may be seen as the probable last result. In 
thesis, too many decision makers have the right to 
exclude others but, in fact, no agent has the privilege 
to use the resource suitably. An insufficient use is the 
corollary for this situation. 
Bureaucracy is also often seen as a possible 
object of application of anti-commons framework. 
The suggestion of Buchanan and Yoon (2000) that 
the anti-commons construction offers an analytical 
means of isolating a central feature of “sometimes 
disparate institutional structures” shows, in fact, the 
problems arisen from bureaucracy in this context.  
Buchanan and Yoon (2000) presented a case on 
which bureaucracy is evident on diminishing the 
potential of a project. On a Buchanan’s visit to 
Sardinia, Italy, in early 1999, he was informed that a 
potential entrepreneur was seeking to invest in a 
combined seaside/hunting-preserve resort. Action 
was inhibited by the necessity of getting permits from 
several regional agencies (for example, the tourist 
board, a hotel-restaurant agency, and the wildlife 
protection agency), each one of which hold effective 
exclusion rights to the project that would, if 
implemented, be productive of value. Another 
example stated by the authors involving the 
bureaucratic barriers was the residential construction. 
Housing permits were showed to require the approval 
of several separate overlapping agencies, each of 
which could prevent construction.  
The persistence of bureaucratic circuits of 
approval and implementation of projects can difficult 
the entrepreneurship activities diminishing the 
potential for regional and local development. The 
present study analyses a problem in which a project is 
proposed to Portuguese authorities to be approved 
according the existing legislation and the rules 
needed for this kind of projects. The delayed 
project’s approval made the project to become 
unviable. 
3. The Problem  
The object of the present study is supported on 
the way how a construction permit in Portugal is got 
for building an elderly nursing home located in a land 
outside the urban area, in a district capital in the 
countryside. 
In recent years, some legislation has been 
published in order to try to facilitate licensing 
procedures. However, these measures just simplified 
the current licensing, i.e. when there is an estate plan 
that provides all the criteria for the construction and 
the permit may not be different from what was 
previously established.  
In case something in the permit application is 
different from the current process, this soon becomes 
more complex and time consuming.   
The process set out herein relates a situation of a 
permit application for an elderly nursing home, which 
became an unusual project, because its respective 
type of use and location were too specific.   
In late September 2008 the first formal meeting 
with the designer was held. Then the aims of the 
project were approached, namely the building 
capacity for a total of 120 users, but at the start of its 
operation it should be able to receive 80 users. In this 
meeting other issues were also approached, such as 
the respective instructions and information provided 
by Social Security for this kind of construction. 
On 18th November 2008 the preliminary study 
of the project was delivered at the Town Hall, so that 
it could give instructions about its feasibility, namely 
on how to license; to the particular location it would 
be necessary to draw up a detailed plan. One month 
after the delivery of this study, the Town Hall 
informed that it was approved and consequently the 
preparation of the Detailed Plan, required for the 
subsequent building permit.  
After this approval, on 8th January 2009, the 
Regional Journal (Reconquista) and on 10th January 
2009, the National Journal (Sol) published Notice No. 
217/2008 about the request for the implementation of 
the referred Detailed Plan. In March 2009 the 
collaboration agreement for the implementation of 
the Detailed Plan was signed between the constructor 
and the Town Hall. However, this agreement and the 
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identification of the Detailed Plan were published in 
the Official Gazette only on 9th June 2009. 
Meanwhile the Town Hall established a period 
of 15 days, ending on 2nd July 2009, for the 
submission of the Detailed Plan Project, which was 
delivered within the requested term. On 29th 
September 2009 the Town Hall sent the first letter 
regarding the project and informing the opinions of 
some consultees, namely the company EDP - 
Electricity of Portugal1 and the public agencies 
ANACOM - National Communications Authority2 
and ARS - Regional Health Authority3 and the Social 
Security. On 9th November 2009 the Town Hall sent 
another letter informing the CCDRC - Committee for 
Coordination and Regional Development Center4 
opinion and asking for the delivery of several 
elements, including the certified maps of the Detailed 
Plan location. 
On 18th December the elements for the 
cartography certification were delivered to the 
Portuguese Geographic Institute5. On 21st April, four 
months after documentation delivery, IGP informed 
that it was necessary to pay 530 € (five hundred and 
thirty euros) in order to get the respective cartography 
certification. Furthermore, they informed that the 
process would be completed only four months after 
payment. The account was settled within eight days. 
On 23rd August IGP sent finally a letter approving 
the cartography, which was immediately forwarded 
to the architect. This one delivered it to the Town 
Hall, as well as the information requested on 9th 
November 2009.  
On 25th November 2010 the Town Hall sent a 
letter enclosing the CCDRC minutes dated 17th 
November 2010 and asking for a few more elements, 
besides the modification of some ones already 
delivered. In January 2011 the new elements were 
delivered to the Town Hall. 
Finally on 23rd March 2011 the Official Gazette 
published that the Detailed Plan was in a public 
discussion phase. 
On 30th June 2011 the Detailed Plan was 
approved in the Municipal Assembly and published 
in the Regional Journal (Reconquista) on 11th August 
                                                            
1 EDP - Eletricidade de Portugal. 
2 ANACOM - Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações. 
3 ARS - Administração Regional de Saúde. 
4 CCDRC - Comissão de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento 
Regional do Centro. 
5 IGP - Instituto Geográfico Português. 
2011. No complaints were made during the public 
discussion phase. Finally the Official Gazette 
published the Detailed Plan on 28th November 2011.  
However, after all this long period, i.e. the 
conclusion of this process –  a nursing home for the 
elderly - the respective licensing for the project was 
put aside, because three years later the economic 
situation had changed a lot and so the project was not 
feasible anymore.   
The situation described above shows that the 
existing plans for the spatial planning and subsequent 
licensing are too strict and it is impossible to adapt 
them in a very short term to the changes occurring 
constantly in the economy.  
In summary, the steps were as follows: 
 




Date Description Legislation in force to date of the project 
Sept. 2008 
First meeting with the designers team to 
draft an elderly nursing home 
 Normative Despatch 96/89, 25/October; 
  Normative Despatch 99/89, 
27/October; 
 Law Decree6 133-A/97 of  30/May 
 Normative Despatch 12/98, 
25/February; 
 Decree 364/98, of 26/June 
 Law Decree 268/99, 15/July; 
  Normative Despatch 62/99, 
12/November; 
 Normative Despatch   30/2006, 8/May; 
 (Decree at present    67/2012, 21/March) 
18 Nov. 2008 
Delivery of the previous project study at 
the Town Hall and application feasibility 
of licensing at the indicated location 
PDM- Hall Master Plan7 in force 
19 Dec. 2008 
The matter was discussed at the Town 
Hall Board meeting and approved its 
implementation 
 
8 Jan. 2009 
The notification was published in the 
Reconquista Journal  on 8 Jan. 2009  
allowing the execution of the Detailed 
Plan Municipal notification 217/2008  
10 Jan. 2009 
Sol Journal published  the notification 
authorizing the execution of the Detailed 
Plan 
3 March 2009 
Signing  the cooperation agreement for 
the implementation of the detailed plan, 
between the contractor and the Town 
Hall  
 
9 June2009 Publication of the collaboration 
agreement for the development of the 
Town Hall Notification 10726  
                                                            
6 DL - Decreto Lei. 
7 PDM - Plano Diretor Municipal. 
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Detailed Plan in the Official Gazette 
2 July 2009 
Deadline for the delivery of the detailed 
plan project by the contractor 
 Law Decree 380/99, 22/September; 
 Law Decree 46/2009, 20/February 
29 Sept. 2009 
Town Hall informed the opinions of 
some consultees: EDP, ANACOM, ARS 
and Social Security 
 
9 Nov. 2009 
Town Hall informed  CCRDC position 
in relation to the Detail plan and 
requested delivery of various elements to 
join the process, the  certified 
cartography among others 
Law Decree 202/2007, 25 May 
18 Dec. 2009 
The necessary elements to carry out 
cartography certification were delivered 
to IGP   
21 April 2010 
The IGP sent bill of 530€ for payment. 
Only after its settlement,   cartographic 
certification would be considered and 
this would take four months  after 
payment 
 
29 April 2010 The account was settled  with the IGP  
23 August 2010 
 IGP letter informing the cartographic 
approval 
 
25 August 2010 
Delivery of cartography approval at the 
Town Hall, as well as other elements 
required on 9 Nov. 
 
25 Nov. 2010 
Town Hall gave notice of the latest 
CCDRC positions CCDRC, enclosing a 
minutes dated 17 Nov. 2010 and 
requesting the delivery of more elements 




Delivery  of all the requested elements to 
Town Hall 
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23 March 2011 
Start of public discussion of the Detail 
Plan. No claims were  submitted  
Notification 7341/2011 
30 June2011 
The Detail Plan was approved at Town 
Hall Meeting  
 
11 August 2011 Reconquista Journal published approval 
of the Detailed Plan  
 
28 Nov. 2011 Official Gazette published approval of 
the  Detailed Plan  
Notification 23713/2011 
 
4. Discussion and Results 
In the present case, a project submitted for 
approval was delayed for so long that when 
entrepreneurs got the permit to exploit the project, the 
suitable time for its economic exploitation was gone. 
This project, which was presented to the Portuguese 
authorities as a profitable business, could be 
implemented as a viable project. However, too many 
departments and entities were asked to decide and 
pronounce about the project. In consequence, 
considering that, and also all the procedures 
demanded for the project approval, the project got 
unviable. This project was not implemented even if it 
could yield net social benefits. 
The existence of numerous rights holders who 
prevented other agents from using a resource (from 
building an elderly nursing home and exploring it 
economically), frustrated what would be a socially 
desirable outcome, considering all the agents 
involved in the project, since the entrepreneurs until 
the beneficiaries of the service. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In Portugal, it is usual that often situations 
emerge in which it is possible to apply the framework 
of anti-commons. Related to bureaucracy, several 
papers have shown this possibility (see for example, 
Filipe et al, 2011a,b).  
This paper shows how several departments of 
local government and other governmental and non 
governmental agencies make a project unviable. All 
of them have to decide about the project. The timings 
to decide are too lengthy and the administrative 
circuits too long and complex. The long process of 
approval has made that the project got unviable and 
consequently it was not implemented. In the “tragedy 
of the anti-commons”, resources often are not 
exploited or, being exploited, too much financial 
resources are spent and, as the suitable time for 
launching the project is gone, the exploitation 
conditions for the project got worse. In these 
scenarios the logical corollary is a loss of value. The 
evidence is that the resources were under-used with 
the obvious consequences of loss of welfare and 
economic value; an important service for the 
community was not offered although the evident 
existence of economic and social interest for all the 
involved agents, entrepreneurs, community, fiscal 
authorities, Town Hall, ... 
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